INTRODUCTION
There is some debate in the current literature about the proper aims of or justifications for intellectual property. 1 Some prominent scholars are concerned about a "retreat from evidence" in IP scholarship. 2 Such scholars point for example to Robert Merges' book Justifying Intellectual Property, which grounds IP partially not necessarily in itself a good reason to avoid the topic. 10 To be clear, America is thankfully not currently fascist.
11
But a gradual slide in that direction may well be taking place, 12 and there is no guarantee that "it" won't happen here. 13 In a broader sense then, the thesis of this essay is that the structure of our private law potentially affects our susceptibility to fascism, and that it is worth trying to understand how. This is not a novel idea, "anti-fascism served as a dominant motivation underlying the post-War antitrust regimes in both the United States and Europe." 14 But this essay provides a novel (as far as the author is aware) argument that anti-fascism could be one appropriate goal or benefit of the patent system, and serves as an invitation for legal scholars to resume or conduct similar analyses in other areas of law.
With its vertical collectivist organization, 15 fascism is both a particular form of totalitarianism, and a particular form of authoritarianism. It is authoritarian (and vertical) in a hierarchical "follow the leader" sense, and it is totalitarian (and nationally collectivist) in that requires complete devotion to the State or the Volk, leaving no space for individual autonomy. 16 As Robert Paxton explains, this obligatory collectivist ultranationalism is a main characteristic of fascism: "the primacy of the group, toward which one has duties superior to every right, whether 10 . Cf. RIEMEN, supra note 8, at 18 ("Wise men like Confucius and Socrates knew that to be able to understand something, you had to call it by its proper name. The term populism, being the preferred description for a modern-day revolt of the masses, will not provide any meaningful understanding concerning that phenomenon.").
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, It Can Happen Here, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 28, 2018), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/06/28/hitlers-rise-it-can-happen-here/ (" [W] ell, it's not fascism, but the United States has not seen anything like it before."); cf. GIROUX, supra note 9, at 44 (" [T] he mobilizing ideas, policies, and ruthless social practices of fascism, wrapped in the flag and discourses of racial purity, ultra-nationalism, and militarism, are at the center of power. . . . ").
12. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 440 (new ed. 1966) ("The road to totalitarian domination leads through many intermediate stages. . . . "); Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 168 ("There is a low risk, in our view, of either military coup or the institutionalization of permanent emergency rule. . . . The threat of constitutional retrogression is more substantial, we think, and more insidious.").
13. See RIEMEN, supra note 8, at 34 ("Camus and Mann certainly weren't the only ones who, once the war was over, quickly realized what we are all too eager to forget: that the fascist bacillus will always remain virulent in the body of mass democracy."); cf. ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 308 (Stuart Gilbert trans., Vintage Books Int'l 1st ed. 1991) (1947) (" [T] he plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.").
14. ) (footnote omitted) ("Although authoritarian regimes often trample civil liberties and are capable of murderous brutality, they do not share fascism's urge to reduce the private sphere to nothing. . . . Authoritarians would rather leave the population demobilized and passive, while fascists want to engage and excite the public. Authoritarians want a strong but limited state.").
individual or universal, and the subordination of the individual to it." 17 As such, deeply embedded notions of American "rugged individualism" and selfdetermination may tend to be defenses against fascism, though on the other hand, there is also a strong conformist aspect to the American ethos. 18 The patent system is designed in part to encourage creative individuals to think differently and invent something that would not have been obvious. 19 In promoting autonomous thinking by incentivizing entrepreneurial innovation, an effective patent system may tend to make us less susceptible to collectivist totalitarianism, albeit perhaps only marginally. A fascist regime does not want free thinking citizens; Victor Klemperer describes the Third Reich as wanting: "to strip everyone of their individuality, to paralyze them as personalities, to make them into unthinking and docile cattle in a herd driven and hounded in a particular direction, to turn them into atoms in a huge rolling block of stone." 20 A society with a greater number of entrepreneurial inventors who think for themselves would seemingly tend to be less prone to complete uniform devotion to a nationalistic vision.
21
At the least, these sorts of effects seem worth thinking about for patent law, and a fortiori for private law in general.
22
How might private law be structured so as to promote individual autonomy? What are the effects of private law on market concentration? How does the promotion of autonomy, or the extent of market concentration, affect our potential susceptibility to fascism? The goal of this essay is not necessarily to provide definitive answers but rather to demonstrate the importance of these sorts of questions and the potential value of further inquiry along these lines. The argument here is not that a well-structured patent system can serve as an absolute barrier to fascism, nor is the claim that a country without a patent system will necessarily be fascist. The patent system is but one factor amongst many, but its effects are nevertheless worthy of consideration. Though the effects on societal levels of individual autonomy attributable to the structure of patent law alone 17 . Id. at 219; see also ROSS, supra note 9, at 7 ("The other side of the paranoid specter of the parasite or the cancer is the national community as an organic body-whether based on biological race theory or cultural-linguistic ethnocentrism.").
18. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, BRIGHT-SIDED: HOW THE RELENTLESS PROMOTION OF POSITIVE THINKING HAS UNDERMINED AMERICA 55 (2009) ("What has changed, in the last few years, is that the advice to at least act in a positive way has taken on a harsher edge. The penalty for nonconformity is going up. . . . ").
19. might be relatively minor, the effects of private law as a whole may well be quite significant. 23 The effects of public law (governing vertical interactions between citizens and the State), 24 on political organization and individual autonomy are, to be sure, also important. For example, a larger estate tax on the wealthy might tend to work against authoritarianism by reducing entrenched hierarchy in society. 25 Moreover, those at the bottom of a highly unequal society, without other prospects for creating meaningful lives, might tend to rally around an ultranationalistic (or racist) worldview, forming the unthinking and loyal "mob" required for totalitarianism.
26
But the point in this essay is that the effects of private law (governing horizontal interactions between citizens) on individual autonomy, while perhaps less obvious, should not be overlooked.
Aside from encouraging an ethos of independent creative thought, in a more tangible economic sense, there is considerable evidence that the economic rewards protected by the patent system tend to facilitate market entry by startups, at least in certain sectors.
27
By working against market concentration, a functional patent system may enhance autonomy by giving technology sector employees more choice as to where to work.
28
Because of the societal benefits of a less concentrated marketplace, the effects of the patent system on market concentration, often overlooked and under-appreciated, 29 are worthy of more attention. History has shown that a patent system may be corrupted and used as a propaganda tool to further a fascist regime.
30
Thus while an ideal patent system may tend to work against fascism, it is essential to protect the integrity and openness of 23. Cf. Adam J MacLeod, Strategic and Tactical Totalization in the Totalitarian Epoch, 5 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 57, 73 (2016) (arguing that that private law is "necessarily at odds with totalitarian rule," in part because "totalitarian governments cannot let freethinking citizens and institutions flex their practical-reasoning muscles on questions of civic importance").
24. The distinction between public and private law is notoriously fuzzy and difficult, but in this essay private law is used to mean law that primarily defines "the rights and duties private individuals and associations owe each other," as opposed to public law, which "regulates the internal conduct of government and government's relationship to private parties." Paul A. the patent system, and be wary of the introduction into patent law of considerations of the inventor's nationality or personal characteristics. Part II contrasts fascism with the notions of individualism reflected in the patent system. Part III discusses how patents can also promote autonomy in an economic sense by reducing market concentration.
II -PHILOSOPHICAL

A. Patents and Individual Autonomy
In Justifying Intellectual Property, 31 Robert Merges makes a strong case for grounding intellectual property partially in the autonomy interest of the inventor or creator. According to Professor Merges, a "personal, autonomous, and active" will, which is "highly individual," is "an essential aspect of what [Kant] thought it means to be human," 32 such that "the essence of property for Kant is this: other people have a duty to respect claims over objects that are bound up with the exercise of an individual's will." 33 For Hegel as well, "property enables the abstract person to develop individuating characteristics that enable her to engage in intersubjective relations."
34
Property is necessary to allow the Kantian autonomous will to flourish, and Merges argues that this justification of property extends to intellectual property rights as well. The ability of an inventor to express her Kantian autonomous will by transforming "off-the-shelf materials into prototypes, rough designs, and finished products," deserves respect, and "stable possession is required for a creator to fully work his will on a found object." 35 As Professor Merges explains, "Michelangelo's rights over a block of marble must include continuing access while he is working on it," and "might very well include the right to control what happens to the statue after he finishes it," so as to "further his purpose or goal in carving the statue, that is, the end to which he 31 This purpose "includes a desire to develop his talent, to earn a reputation as an artist, and ultimately to make a living as an artist," so as to "fully reflect and encourage an expansive sense of the creator's autonomy." 37 Patents may similarly be seen as supporting inventor autonomy, by granting inventors the extended possession which protects the "mental toil and perspiration" that is required for an inventive vision to be had or to be realized in the world. 38 Additionally, it has been argued that "inventors have a strong personhood stake in their inventions and in the inventive process," and an inventor has "autonomy over her own inventiveness," which patents help to protect.
39
A patentable invention is in some sense, by definition, a result of autonomous creative thinking that would not have been obvious even to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art. 40 One way of tailoring the patent law to better promote individualism, then, might be to strengthen the non-obviousness requirement, i.e., require a greater "inventive step" beyond the prior art in order to receive a patent. Other commentators have already argued in favor of this sort of heightened bar to patentability, pointing out that a "low obviousness requirement can 'stifle, rather than promote, the progress of the useful arts.'"
41
Requiring a greater inventive step might tend to incentivize individuals and or small groups (such as startups) to think more creatively, aiming for major breakthroughs as opposed to mere marginal improvements over the prior art. Although this would result in a reduction of the number of patents granted, it would not necessarily work against the market dispersing benefits of patents discussed in Part III, given that startups tend to be disproportionately creative and particularly well suited to fundamental breakthrough innovation, rather than mere marginal improvements. 42 Requiring a larger inventive step could result in fewer patents granted, but it would also strengthen enforceability and restore some public confidence in the patent system by ensuring that only true inventions receive patents.
According to economic historian Professor Zorina Khan, the "fuel of interest" supplied by the U.S. patent system has "induced growing numbers of people he specific danger inherent in large-scale organisation is that its natural bias and tendency favour order, at the expense of creative freedom."); Lee, supra note 5, at 364 ("Numerous studies reveal that small entities are disproportionately innovative relative to large corporations.").
to invest more in inventive activity and innovation," and has been "instrumental in directing the efforts of a diverse array of individuals toward extracting returns from their improvements." 43 The fundamental spirit of the patent law is thus in part one of Kantian sapere aude -of daring to think for oneself -antipodal to the "follow the leader" style anti-intellectualism of fascism.
44
B. Fascism and Individual Autonomy
Fascist philosophy could fairly be characterized as consisting of extreme nationalism and racism. 45 In discussing more elaborate characterizations, the purpose here is certainly not to give fascism more credit than it deserves; rather, it is to understand the state-wide totalitarian nationalistic collectivism of fascism, so as to consider how private law (including patent law) might tend to work against preconditions for fascism by promoting individualism. That the Kantian autonomy ideally reflected in and promoted by the patent system is antithetical to the philosophy of fascism can be seen, for example, in the words of Giovanni Gentile:
The Fascist State, in order to penetrate and direct the consciousness of its citizens, wishes to organize them in national unity; a unity possessed of a soul. That unity would manifest itself as a unitary being, possessed of powerful will, and a consciousness of its own ends. 46 This idea of a unity, or "unitary being" possessed of a will is somewhat reminiscent of, but very different from, Kant's notion of the Wille, the universal, rationalizing will or collective sense of reason, (as opposed to the "personal will," or Willkur).
47
Gentile holds, unlike Kant, that the personal will is entirely eclipsed or subsumed by the will of the unitary being such that: "My will is not my own; it is a universal will." 44. See PAXTON, supra note 16, at 139 ("Since leaders supposedly had superhuman mental powers, fascist militants preferred to settle intellectual matters by a reductio ad ducem."); cf. RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 20 ("In every walk of life, independence of mind is punished by failure, more and more as economic organizations grow larger and more rigid. Is it surprising that men become increasingly docile, increasingly ready to submit to dictation and to forego the right of thinking for themselves?").
45. Cf. TONY JUDT WITH TIMOTHY SNYDER, THINKING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 159 (2012) ("The fascists don't really have concepts. They have attitudes."); ROSS, supra note 9, at 331 ("Fascism is fidelity to inequality and brutality.").
46. GIOVANNI GENTILE, ORIGINS AND DOCTRINE OF FASCISM 72 (A. James Gregor ed., A. James Gregor Trans., Routledge 2017) (1932); see also PAXTON, supra note 16, at 17 ("Only in 1932, after he had been in power for ten years, and when he wanted to 'normalize' his regime, did Mussolini expound Fascist doctrine, in an article (partly ghostwritten by the philosopher Giovanni Gentile) for the new Enciclopedia italiana.").
47. In Justifying Intellectual Property, Merges speaks primarily of the personal Kantian will, or Willkur. See MERGES, supra note 3, at 338 n.24. The Kantian universal rationalizing Wille could perhaps be analogized to the legal community's collective sense of reason, something akin to "thinking like a lawyer."
48. GENTILE, supra note 46, at 84; cf. CAMUS, supra note 13, at 167 ("No longer were there individual destinies; only a collective destiny, made of plague and the emotions shared by all.").
the idea of the fascist state or group as "unitary being" (or Volk), and argues that fascism should be seen as "an ethos, a philosophy, a way of thought." 49 According to Verbovszky, fascists begin with the conception of life as a struggle, where the only way to survive "is to be stronger than one's adversary." 50 The way to make it in this cruel world, for fascists, is to band together into a Volk, where the "family is grafted out of its purely domestic role and onto the national stage." 51 The Volk is Gentile's "unitary being," a meta-person, it is "an impersonal individual who possesses a separate and transcendent will made from the collective wills of all the people in a society." 52 Similarly, Roger Griffin finds that fascism "tends to be associated with a concept of the nation as a 'higher' racial, historical, spiritual or organic reality which embraces all the members of the ethical community who belong to it." 53 Thus the people in a fascist society (or State) 54 are all part of a "collective consciousness, a 'hive-mind' so to speak, that has its own consciousness and will, functioning as an individual person," such that for fascists, "the only real concern of a person's life should be that he directs himself according to the will of the Volk." 55 Verbovzky claims that history has shown fascists individually to be "quite unafraid of death" (citing for example the Japanese Kamakazi), 56 which would be in accord with the idea that a fascist society tends to view itself as a single unitary being. 57 The fascist requirement of complete devotion to a unitary being identified with the State is quite incompatible with individual autonomy. he imperial Japanese sought to forge a warrior mentality across all of Japan, a warrior mentality which valued sacrifice and, through certain tenets of Zen Buddhism allowed for willful acceptance of death and self-annihilation which eventually represented itself in the famous Kamikaze in the latter portion of the war.").
57. Cf. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 172 (30th anniversary ed. 2006) ("Kamikaze behaviour and other forms of altruism and cooperation by workers are not astonishing once we accept the fact that they are sterile. . . . The death of a single sterile worker bee is no more serious to its genes than is the shedding of a leaf in autumn to the genes of a tree.").
58. See CHRIS HEDGES, EMPIRE OF ILLUSION 112 (2009) ("The single most important quality needed to resist evil is moral autonomy."); PAXTON, supra note 16, at 40 ("Fascisms seek out in each national culture those themes that are best capable of mobilizing a mass movement of regeneration, unification, and purity, directed against liberal individualism and constitutionalism and against Leftist class struggle.").
59. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."); MILTON FRIEDMAN, fascist state must be entirely or religiously devoted to the Volk. 60 According to Robert Paxton, "fascist leaders enjoyed a kind of supremacy," which "rested on charisma, a mysterious direct communication with the Volk or razza that needs no mediation" and "resembled media-era celebrity 'stardom,' raised to a higher power by its say over war and death." 61 The fascist hive-mind or unitary being is of course never fully realized in practice, 62 but fascist societies attempt to move in this direction by developing methods of "differentiating who is and who is not part of the Volk."
63
The "Volk, although based on the concept of ethnicity and race ultimately sets its own parameters of belonging," 64 that is, the methods of differentiation may be rooted primarily in ethnicity, as in the case of Nazis, or may instead be rooted more in citizenship, as in the case of the Italian fascists.
65
In fascist societies, individuals who refuse to assimilate or conform to the requirements of the State "must be expelled from the society or eradicated to preserve the organic unity of the Volk," because "conflicting identities interfere with the general interest of the Volk and result in something quite unacceptable to Fascists, a pluralistic society." 61. PAXTON, supra note 16, at 126. 62. GRIFFIN, supra note 53, at 41 ("[F]ascism must always in the last analysis be imposed by an elite in the name of a national community yet to be realized, and whose realization, even once the movement is installed in power, will initially (and in practice indefinitely) involve re-education, propaganda and social control on a massive scale.").
63. Verbovszky, supra note 49, at 6 (emphasis added); see also PAXTON at 216 (explaining that fascism finds a technique to channel citizens' "passions into the construction of an obligatory domestic unity around projects of internal cleansing and external expansion").
64 Fascism is facially inconsistent with Kantian individual autonomy, or Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," which posits that "all people should be treated as 'ends in themselves. '" 68 The patent system provides one potential means of promoting or reinforcing such individual autonomy, albeit a rather minor one, though the effects of private law as a whole may well be more than minor.
C. Patents and Propaganda
But the patent system must remain objectively focused on technology and innovation; if it loses its integrity it may be turned into a propaganda tool for fascism. 69 Something of this sort appears to have happened in Nazi Germany, where the patent system (along with the economy in general) was "Aryanized," in that new patents were only to be submitted if sponsored by an Aryan and German citizen (not by foreigners or Jews), and important patents were to be transferred to "non-Jewish control." 70 This was in part a way to promote Hitler's vision of the inventor as Aryan hero, highlighting the supposed inventive superiority of the Aryan Volk. 71 The Nazi patent code "made it a special point to protect the inventor against exploitation and abuse," but also "the inventor had a duty to grant the state special powers when that was in the national interest," so overall the "new code adhered to the party line" as regards to the "basic principle that the interests of the people and the state come before the special interests of the individual." 72 Thus, wrote some of the drafters, the "creative forces of technological progress serve to the honor of Volk and the State," and the "interests of the Volk and the State come before those of the creator of the work." 73 will over private will rather than manifesting any intention to protect the interests of a particular party." 74 In the years leading up to this Aryanization of the patent system, there was a push for legal protection and economic realization of "German intellectual matter, free from Jewish greed, borne by national pride and braced by the motto: 'German creations for the Germans first!'" 75 Jewish patent attorneys were expelled from the profession, so as to "clean up the invention-promotion business."
76
While certainly not rising to this level, the fact that the U.S. State Department was recently considering "public diplomacy" efforts using the hashtag "#MostAmericanIP," is not reassuring.
77
What exactly would it mean for a patent to be more or less American? Referencing this incident, Sapna Kumar has observed that "[t]he government's commitment to promoting innovation can, at times, border on propaganda." 78 The Aryanization of the German patent system could be seen as an example of the "friend/enemy distinction" creeping into the patent law. This friend/enemy distinction is a hallmark of fascist legal thought, as seen in the work of the famous Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt, 79 who offered "that distinction as crucial to the intelligibility and practice of politics (in the same way, as he put it, that good/evil is key to morality or beautiful/ugly is key to aesthetics)." 76. Id. at 214. 77. See David Kravets, State Department concocting "fake" intellectual property "Twitter feud," ARS TECHNICA (Jul. 6, 2017, 1:41 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/07/state-departmentconcocting-fake-intellectual-property-twitter-feud/ ("Our public diplomacy office is still settling on a hashtag and a specific moment that will be unique to the State Department, but then we invite you to respond with your own #MostAmericanIP, or #BestIPMoment." (quoting E-mail from U.S. State Dep't to Mark A. Lemley, Dir. of the Stan. Program in Law, Sci., and Tech., Stan. L. Sch.)).
78. Sapna Kumar, Innovation Nationalism, 51 CONN. L. REV. (manuscript at 25) (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3134106; cf. Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks delivered at the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Inaugural Texas Dinner (Oct. 18, 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-eastern-districttexas-bar-association-inaugural-texas) ("Born of our Constitution and steeped in our glorious history, the American patent system is a crown jewel; a gold standard. Stop attacking it.").
79 "justice" thus lies in The Leader's hands, rather than those of the law. 83 Unifying the people (or the Volk) against "the enemy," helps to create or stoke the ultranationalist collectivism required for fascism. 84 With respect to patent law, then, the law should remain objectively focused on technological merits, rather than the nationality or personal characteristics of the inventors; the patent system should not become a tool for nationalistic propaganda.
III -ECONOMIC
An effective patent system may tend to promote or protect autonomy in a more tangible economic sense, by decreasing market concentration. The effects of the patent system on market concentration seem to depend on the industrial sector, varying based on industry characteristics such as the importance of network effects, and the size of initial research and development costs versus the costs of copying for particular technologies. 85 Given the importance of market concentration to individual autonomy, 86 the effects are worth considering, not only for patent law but for other areas of private law as well, including antitrust. This part first considers the evidence suggesting that a functional patent system may reduce market concentration in certain sectors; second considers how reduced market concentration may promote autonomy; and third considers how market structure may tend to affect our susceptibility to fascism.
A. Market Concentration and Patents
Professor Merges finds that the "general policy suggested by Kant's writings has to do with encouraging a larger number of smaller creative entities, as opposed to a smaller number of larger ones." 87 He argues that intellectual property can further this general policy, for example, property rights covering inputs (such as a touchscreen for cell phones) "allow the makers of the input to set themselves up as a separate, independent firm," which "gives them more say over their work, more control over their professional fate-more autonomy." The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey showed, according to Merges, a "resurgence of small companies as a major source of new technologies," and that for "creative scientists, engineers, and inventors of all stripes, this has meant new opportunities to own and participate in small companies," with patents being "one key to the success of these companies."
90
That survey also showed that "the holding of patents by technology-based startups is even more widespread than previously believed," 91 and that a primary reason startups patent "is to prevent others from copying the startup's products and services." 92 Similarly, a 2017 study finds evidence that, at least in the IT sector, patents may be particularly valuable for startups.
93
A startup with patent protection may specialize in a narrow product or service, instead of trying to compete directly with the integrated technology behemoths. 94 This suggests that in the absence of a functional patent system, there would be a more concentrated technology marketplace, particularly in spaces with significant network effects such as software and information technology, 95 as large companies would be undeterred from using their vast resources to copy or reverse engineer the products and services offered by successful startups.
96
The large would-be infringers could then integrate their knockoff versions into their existing networked suites of products and services, a potentially insurmountable marketplace advantage. sense that, in order to integrate the startup's invention, an incumbent must at least either buy the startup, 98 or potentially face an infringement lawsuit. 99 Such a suit could be brought directly by the startup, but a startup might prefer to sell its patents to a non-practicing assertion entity (sometimes called a "patent troll") thereby avoiding the risk and distraction of a lawsuit, as well as generating immediate revenue that could help keep the startup afloat. The existence of this possibility could encourage a large incumbent to buy a startup instead of simply infringing secure in the knowledge that the startup likely lacks the resources and will to engage in the protracted litigation necessary to enforce patent rights. Without patent protection, some innovative startups might not receive the funding necessary to get off the ground, for as Peter Menell has observed: "Without the potential for a large reward, inventors contemplating innovative new platforms might not be willing to make the substantial, risky R&D and marketing investments needed to challenge, and hopefully leapfrog, the incumbent platform." 100 Patent protection in this way facilitates the ability of startups to obtain the financing and investment (often in the form of venture capital) necessary to enter the market, at least in certain important sectors outside of pharmaceuticals, such as software, information technology, and biomedical devices. 101 In other words, "patents are powerful antimonopoly weapons-the vital slingshots 'Davids' use to take on 'Goliaths.'" 102 As such, proposals that have been advanced (generally under the auspices of economic efficiency) "to maintain the patent system on drugs and a few other products that are expensive to innovate and cheap to copy, and eliminate patents on everything else," 103 could have the undesirable (and probably unintended) effect of increasing market concentration by maintaining patents only in those sectors where patents tend to benefit incumbents rather than new entrants. Thus without patents, the "winner-take-all" nature of many technology markets, 104 could become even more pronounced. 105 Reducing market concentration is in accord with the patent system's goals; though this purpose is not as prominent in the more modern jurisprudence. Supreme Court decisions in cases such as Kewanee, 106 and Bonito Boats, 107 placed a striking emphasis on the patent systems role in fostering a competitive marketplace and protecting the rights of smaller businesses. 108 The theory that patents facilitate market entry and reduce technology market concentration also finds some support in "[the] historical lobbying behavior in the patent context, which shows that small inventors (or investment entities that fund small inventors) tend to promote strong intellectual property coverage while large technology-dependent firms (outside of pharmaceuticals and chemicals) tend to promote moderate and sometimes even weak or zero levels of intellectual property coverage," as Jonathan Barnett has noted. 109 More recently, Professor Barnett has argued that "reducing IP rights can increase costs for users while raising entry barriers." 110 According to Professor Barnett, the support of pharmaceutical industry incumbents "for strong patents can be explained by the exceptionally large difference between the R&D, testing, and marketing costs borne by a first-mover innovator and the far smaller costs borne by any second-mover entrant." 111 An additional factor might be the relative lack of alternative (non-patent) means of investment protection for pharmaceutical incumbents.
There is thus reason to think that "small, specialized technology companies are especially reliant on IP rights because, compared to larger companies, they have fewer ways to capitalize on research and development investments."
112
Although there are certainly other factors at play, the general weakening of the patent system over the past decade or so, 113 has coincided with an increase in the concentration of markets. 114 Moreover, some of the recent changes to patent law, such as the move to first-to-file as opposed to first to invent, may provide advantages to larger entities who tend to be less constrained in their ability to bear the costs of filing for patents.
115
Programs at the USPTO to reduce fees and provide pro bono representation for smaller entity patent filers may help to offset such costs, and should be encouraged.
116
B. Market Concentration and Individual Autonomy
Given that patents may tend to reduce concentration in certain technology markets, this section considers the relationship between market concentration and autonomy. A precondition for personal autonomy is that one must have a sufficient number of options to choose among for the choice to be meaningful. 114. See, e.g., Grullon et al., supra note 98, at 2 ("In real terms, the average publicly-traded firm is three times larger today than it was twenty years ago. Lax enforcement of antitrust regulations and increasing technological barriers to entry appear to be important factors behind this trend. Overall, our findings suggest that the nature of US product markets has undergone a structural shift that has weakened competition.").
115. See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 521 (2013); Asay, supra note 113, at 55 ("The worry with the AIA's new priority rules is that large companies will often receive patents-even when resourceconstrained parties were the first to invent-simply because the larger companies' superior resources enable them to file patent applications more quickly.").
116. See Lee, supra note 5, at 341; Osborn et al., supra note 29, at 1247 (proposing an increase in maintenance fees, but maintaining reduced fees for small and micro entities, so as to benefit individual inventors and small businesses).
117. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 374 (1986); see also 2 JOHN FINNIS, INTENTION AND IDENTITY: COLLECTED ESSAYS 9-10 (2011) ("[I]f the substance is not merely organically developing, as animals do, but has self-mastery that is entailed by being able to make free choices, choices made and carried out not by one's being acted upon but on one's own initiative and intention and responsibility, then we have that more special and perfect kind of substance that we call a person.").
a less concentrated, more diverse marketplace of firms, a functional patent system could increase autonomy by giving technology sector employees more possible places to work or more choice, as has been observed:
In an industry with many employers, a worker looking for a job has a variety of prospects. If one employer is a bad fit, a worker might find a better spot somewhere else. Someone who feels unappreciated can look elsewhere. This kind of diversity is a meaningful component of freedom in modern society. When industries become consolidated, individual freedom is diminished. 118 A more diffuse marketplace, by allowing citizens more opportunity to pursue their interests, with less pressure to conform to the demands of a few large potential employers, may thus foster a more innovative society, thereby promoting progress in science and the useful arts. 119 The desirability of employee mobility in terms of promoting autonomy may also provide another reason for restrictions on the enforceability of non-compete agreements. 120 Patents probably do not do much, if anything, to protect the autonomy of the poor, 121 and this essay is certainly not meant to suggest that the patent system is some sort of elixir to all that ails our society. But by reducing market concentration, a functional patent system may promote and protect the individual autonomy of parts of the middle classes, employees in the technology sector, which matters in part because recruitment (or destruction) of the middle classes is an important if not essential condition for fascism to take hold. 122 And the technology sector is not a trivial part of the U.S. economy, by one measure, the software industry alone accounted for 2.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 2012, and 2.2 percent of U.S. jobs in 2014.
system may prevent the depression of wages and thereby protect and reinforce important parts of the middle class. 124 A less concentrated marketplace also increases the number of individuals who have top-level leadership positions, furthering individual autonomy in this way as well, for "[e]very time an independent firm is swallowed by a corporate behemoth, top executives-the chief executive, operating, and financial officers; the general counsel; division and department heads; and so on-suffer demotions in authority and self-image."
125
In other words, "someone who was previously a chief executive officer and captain of his or her ship became a mere member of the crew in a corporate bureaucracy." 
C. National Vertical Collectivism
The form of market concentration that has advanced under neoliberalism, 128 can also increase cynicism about democracy when behemoths leverage their vast economic power to influence the State and benefit from corporate welfare and rent seeking. 129 Robert Reich points out that it is "perhaps no accident that those who argue most vehemently on behalf of an immutable and rational 'free market' and against government 'intrusion' are often the same people who exert disproportionate influence over the market mechanism." 130 A highly concentrated or monopolized market would also tend to be more susceptible to capture by or merger with the State. Indeed, the Weimar Republic German economy was highly concentrated when fascism took hold, 131 it had no antitrust law and "the historical record suggests that the presence of a highly concentrated industrial sector facilitated Hitler's rapid consolidation of political control in Germany during the mid-1930s."
132
As Milton Friedman has put it: "Let both economic and political power be in the same hands and the only protection of political freedom is the good will of those in power-a frail recourse particularly in view of the corrupting influence of power and the talents that make for political survival."
133 If large corporations become so powerful as to effectively capture the State, Freidman's observation may counsel in favor of structuring private law in ways that tend to restrain (rather than augment) the power of large corporations. 134 By weakening or reconfiguring the state to serve the interests of wealthy private market actors, neoliberalism's agenda moves us toward this sort of inversion.
135
The neoliberal program has also involved a deliberate and troubling attempt to shape the American mind, 132. Crane, supra note 14, at 15. "Prior to reconstruction under the Allies, Germany had no antitrust law-at least none that would be recognizable under contemporary global standards." Id. at 16.
133. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 14; see also RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 76 (explaining that "[h]uge organizations, both political and economic," ought "to leave as large a share of control as possible in the hands of individuals and small groups," and "[i]f this is not done, the men at the head of these vast organizations will infallibly become tyrannous through the habit of excessive power, and will in time interfere in ways that crush out individual initiative"). 135. See Schlag, supra note 9, at 11 (footnote omitted) ("Neoliberalism involves the reconfiguration of the state to service the various interests of powerful market actors in civil society. It is a kind of inversion in which various actors in civil society refashion the state in their own image, idioms, modes of management.").
136. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Powell Memorandum: Attack on American Free Enterprise System, SCHOLARLY COMMONS, 21 (Aug. 23, 1971), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=powellmemo ("The national television networks should be monitored in the same way that textbooks should be kept under constant surveillance."); Schlag, supra note 9, at 63 ("Justice Powell wants to intervene in the culture industry-to win hearts and minds by deliberate intervention in and capture of public institutions.").
subservient to corporate power, and also potentially more amenable to authoritarian or hierarchical societal organization. 137 Professor Schlag describes neoliberalism as having matured into "an effort to fashion the individual liberal subject as a particular kind of self-one disciplined for market governance and market functions," by refashioning moral, cultural, and political discourse "in instrumentalized market terms," such that "community becomes networking," "knowledge becomes expertise," and "scholars become thought-leaders." 138 As Henry Giroux puts it, "shaping the neoliberal framing of public and higher education is a corporate-based ideology," where there is little talk of "educating students as critical citizens rather than potential employees of Walmart." 139 This trend away from any thoughtful form of civic discourse is disturbing, as Hannah Arendt recalls that "[n]othing proved easier to destroy than the privacy and private morality of people who thought of nothing but safeguarding their private lives." 140 Although the competitive ethos of neoliberalism might facially seem to promote individuality, there is a distinction between "the psychological concept of vertical individualism (VI) [which] values competition and outperforming others," and "horizontal individualism (HI) [which] characterizes the desire to be unique and different from equal others." 141 The American neoliberal form of competitive individualism is far more vertical than horizontal. 142 While both forms of individualism may tend to work against pure fascism, (as they are both somewhat inconsistent with the concept of a national collective Volk), vertical (or competitive) individualism is more compatible with authoritarianism in general. 143 A diverse marketplace of technology firms with varying cultures may tend to cultivate a more horizontal individualism, fostering differences by allowing employees more opportunity to find the right fit. 144 Conversely, when individuals cannot find belonging in a community, they may be more susceptible to extreme nationalism, identifying with a collectivist and nationalistic State. 145 In this regard, going too far in the direction of individual isolation could be problematic and make a society more susceptible to fascism.
146
The desirable middle ground is to foster an environment with a variety of diverse communities (with corporations being one aspect) where individuals have some autonomy and choice as to which communities they associate with.
147
This would seem to allow individuals more opportunity to productively cultivate their lives and selves in diverse ways, instead of by identifying with an ultranationalistic State or Volk.
Fascism constructs its ideology and program opportunistically, 148 and an American variant of fascism might attempt to take advantage of and integrate the prevailing neoliberal ethos of vertical individualism; it could perhaps look something like a nationwide corporation (or consolidated group of large corporations), where citizens look something like at will employees.
149
A citizen who refuses to fall in line could be "fired" and for example denied healthcare, with nowhere else to turn. Citizens would then have no choice but to obey the national or corporate authorities -which due to market concentration coupled with neoliberal corruption, may be effectively one and the same.
Citizens in such a society might be characterized by a vertical collectivism, where "the individual sees the self as an aspect of an in-group, but the members of the in-group are different from each other, some having more status than others," and 145. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 53, at 188 ("In the case of fascism, its core myth of the regenerated national community led by a revolutionary elite calls a priori for an act of identification, a neurologically based mischannelling of the human drive for self-transcendence."); FRANZ NEUMANN, Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 233, 244-45 (Herbert Marcuse ed.,1957) (describing "totalitarian social controls," as including the "atomization and isolation of the individual, which involves . . . the imposition of huge and undifferentiated mass organizations which leave the individual isolated and more easily manipulable").
146. Cf. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 317 ("[T]he masses grew out of the fragments of a highly atomized society whose competitive structures and concomitant loneliness of the individual had been held in check only through membership in a class."); PAXTON, supra note 16, at 50 ("[T]hose already deeply engaged, from generation to generation, in the rich subculture of socialism, with its clubs, newspapers, unions, and rallies, were simply not available for another loyalty.").
147. Cf. RUSSELL, supra note 119, at 59 ("Where art has flourished in the past it has flourished as a rule amongst small communities which had rivals among their neighbors, such as the Greek City States, the little Principalities of the Italian Renaissance, and the petty Courts of German eighteenth-century rulers.").
148. See Schlag, supra note 9, at 11 n.20; see also PAXTON, supra note 16, at 10 (explaining that early on, "fascist movements flaunted their contempt for bourgeois values and for those who wanted only 'to earn money,'" and "attacked 'international finance capitalism,'" though once in power "they did nothing to carry out these anticapitalist threats"); RIEMEN, supra note 8, at 81-82 ("[F]ascism would take on different forms in different countries because there were no ideas and no single universal value underlying fascism's credo. . . . "sacrificing for the in-group is an important aspect of this pattern." 150 This vertical collectivism seems to fairly describe "in-groups" such as the employees of a corporation, but in fascism, the "in-group" is the State or the Volk, so if the State were to begin to look like one large corporation, then we would seem, on a national level, to be shifting from vertical individualism to vertical collectivism, and trending towards fascism. 151 Fascism is characterized in part by "the right of the chosen people to dominate others without restraint from any kind of human or divine law, right being decided by the sole criterion of the group's prowess within a Darwinian struggle." 152 Communism is theoretically characterized by a horizontal collectivism, as opposed to fascism's vertical collectivism, but both are collectivist on a national and totalitarian level. 153 While "find another job" might be an appropriate response to a disobedient employee, "find another country" is not an appropriate state response to a peacefully dissenting citizen. 154 The actions of the (liberal democratic) state "must respect democracy and the rule of law," though the "persons and practices comprising civil society" are not necessarily required to "observe those commitments in their dealings with each other."
155
Corporations fairly demand a certain degree of conformity, and "Americans can be fired for [almost] anything, such as failing to generate positive vibes." 156 This is relatively unproblematic so long as association with the corporation
